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Abstract
We investigated the effect of structural interdependencies between groups (especially
inequality), and interdependencies between individuals on ingroup favoritism in minimal
group situations. Previous research has attempted to determine whether ingroup favoritism
is produced by categorization or intragroup interdependencies (reciprocation expectations),
but recent literature suggests that it is not possible to tease these influences apart. We
report two studies that investigate how ingroup favoritism evolves over time in social interac-
tion. The levels of ingroup favoritism were affected by categorization and inequality, and the
level of ingroup favoritism changed over time, increasing or decreasing depending on the
nature of the initial intergroup structure. We conclude by providing two explanations for this
change: emergent norms, and changes to the intergroup situation produced by interaction.
Our experiments confirm the value of studying the evolution of minimal group behavior,
especially for explaining why low status groups act to preserve intergroup inequalities.
Introduction
The underlying causes of ingroup favoritism—or “parochial altruism”–have been of enduring
interest to social psychologists, economists, and others seeking to explain the persistence of
intergroup conflict, prejudice and inequality. However, researchers have seldom studied the
evolution of ingroup favoritism.
In the first part of this article, we review experiments that have used the minimal group par-
adigm (MGP) to show that ingroup favoritism is a relational phenomenon, shaped by interde-
pendencies between groups and individuals. Although relationships of interdependence evolve
over time and in interaction, these temporal aspects of ingroup favoritism have only just
begun to attract research attention. We then report the results of a program of experimental
work that has sought to determine how the context and process of interaction can affect
ingroup favoritism. We conclude by reflecting on our findings that interaction can promote
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both ingroup and outgroup favoritism, which can either accentuate or attenuate inequalities
between groups.
Intergroup Interdependence
The MGP eliminates social interaction, thus giving researchers sufficient control to study the
underlying causes of ingroup favoritism. The benchmark studies were conducted by Tajfel and
his colleagues in the early 1970s [1]. They randomly assigned twelve-year-old boys into groups
and asked them to allocate monetary rewards to ingroup and outgroup members privately,
without having met or interacted with any other participants. Although there was some evi-
dence of fairness in the allocation, they found that participants also discriminated against out-
group members. This result has sometimes been interpreted as showing that ingroup
favoritism is caused by social categorization [2].
However, this was not the significance that Tajfel and his colleagues drew from the studies
[3, 4]. For them, the important finding was not that participants favored the ingroup, but that
they were prepared to take less in absolute material terms in order to be relatively better off
than the outgroup [2, 5]. Their findings argued against the primacy of economic explanations
of social behavior. Here, experimental participants were seen to act against their naked eco-
nomic interests, accepting less monetary reward for the ingroup in order to ensure that they
were relatively better off than outgroup members. Turner et al. [6] suggested that there were
social psychological interests at play, and Social Identity Theory was developed to explain the
nature of these interests in terms of intergroup processes of categorization, comparison, and
self-esteem:
“subjects define and evaluate themselves in terms of the imposed social categories, compare
ingroup with outgroup in terms of the only available value dimensions (money, ’points,’
evaluative scales) and seek positive distinctiveness for their own group by awarding it more
money.”
(p.30)
We might characterize social identity theory as an intergroup interdependence theory of
social behavior because it situates the phenomenon in the context of intergroup relations.
Although Tajfel and his colleagues challenged Sherif’s economic explanation of prejudice, they
endorsed his intergroup relations perspective. In his summer camp studies, Sherif [7, 8] had
shown that prejudice could be created by setting groups in relations of economic competition,
and could be eliminated by fostering intergroup cooperation for shared interest. In a similar
vein, Tajfel and Turner [3, 4] argued that the positive distinctiveness motive would only result
in ingroup favoritism under specified conditions of intergroup relations: It depended on
whether the boundaries between groups were permeable, and whether the social status hierar-
chy was deemed legitimate and stable. Tajfel and Turner [4, 9] reviewed a number of cases in
which low status group members manifested outgroup favoritism under conditions of social
oppression, where individuals were unable to leave the group, and where the social status hier-
archy was deemed stable and legitimate. The key to producing ingroup favoritism in the MGP
was to create a particular kind of intergroup situation in which the boundaries were imperme-
able and status relations were unstable. These were the “certain conditions” under which Tajfel
et al. [1] expected social categorization to lead to “intergroup behavior which discriminates
against the outgroup and favors the ingroup.” (p.151)
Subsequent research has shown how other features of the intergroup situation can
strengthen or weaken ingroup favoritism. Although low status groups demonstrate outgroup
Evolution of Ingroup Favoritism in Interaction
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974 November 16, 2016 2 / 26
favoritism when the status differences are perceived to be stable and legitimate, they show
ingroup favoritism when the status hierarchy is deemed illegitimate; and high status groups
may respond to unfairness with compensatory favoritism toward low status groups [10, 11].
Similarly, ingroup favoritism is affected by ingroup and outgroup norms—e.g., competition
versus fairness and loyalty versus equality—which define the nature of the intergroup relation-
ship at any point in time [12, 13]. All these manipulations of the basic MGP support the inter-
group interdependence perspective of social identity theory, namely, that categorization leads
to ingroup favoritism only under certain conditions of intergroup relations.
Intragroup Interdependence
Rabbie, Schot and Visser [14] argued that the minimal group studies conducted by Tajfel and
his colleagues did not warrant the rejection of the economic explanation of ingroup favoritism.
They argued that members of minimal groups were bound together by an “interdependence of
fate” (p. 172) in addition to them belonging to distinct social categories. Consequently, inter-
dependence and categorization were confounded, and it was possible that ingroup favoritism
was driven by economic self-interest rather than social categorization. They argued that MGP
participants attempted to secure most resources by cooperating with other ingroup members,
believing ingroup members to be mutually dependent on each other and expecting ingroup
members to reciprocate in turn.
The effects of reciprocation expectation on ingroup favoritism are now well-established.
Locksley, Ortiz, and Hepburn [15] showed that ingroup favoritism in the MGP ceased when
participants were given ‘feedback’ that in previous trials they were favored by outgroup rather
than ingroup members. In contrast, ingroup favoritism could be strengthened if participants
believed that they had been previously favored by the ingroup (see experiment 3 [16]; experi-
ment 3 & 4 [15]; and experiment 1 [13]). Rabbie et al. [14] manipulated dependence and recip-
rocation expectations in a MGP experiment by telling participants that they would receive the
money they were awarded by ingroup members only, outgroup members only, or from the
allocations from both groups. Consistent with their expectations, they found that participants
allocated most money to ingroup or outgroup members they perceived themselves to be most
dependent on, even reversing ingroup favoritism in the outgroup dependence condition.
Karp, Jin, Yamagishi and Shinotsuka [17] showed that ingroup favoritism in MGP disappeared
when participants were paid a fixed sum by the experimenter. Gaertner and Insko [18] manip-
ulated the dependence structure by giving participants unilateral control over the allocation of
monetary rewards or by making their rewards dependent on the allocation by others; and the
participants were either categorized into groups or not. Female participants favored the
ingroup regardless of the dependence structure, whereas males favored the ingroup only in the
presence of dependence.
Yamagishi and his colleagues have conducted a number of experiments to show that
ingroup favoritism in the MGP depends on the expectation of ingroup reciprocation and is
eliminated when reciprocation can be established directly with ingroup or outgroup mem-
bers [19–21]. They had MGP participants play experimental two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) games in which individual payoffs depended on the decisions of both players. They
would achieve the optimal collective outcome if both cooperated, but would do poorly if
both defected. Individuals received the highest possible payoff if they defected but their
partner cooperated, but would receive the lowest possible payoff if they cooperated but their
partner defects. Ingroup favoritism was evident when participants cooperated with ingroup
members but not outgroup members. Yamagishi and his colleagues argued that participants
favored ingroup members in expectation of ingroup reciprocation, thus allowing
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cooperating ingroup members to achieve the highest collective payout. Hypothesized
ingroup favoritism occurred in simultaneous games where players are thoroughly interde-
pendent, each having to rely on the “generalized exchange belief” that ingroup members
will reciprocate. However, this effect was extinguished in sequential games where partici-
pants made allocations as the first player, knowing that their allocation would be visible to
the second player. Yamagishi and Mifune [21] argued that participants collaborated equally
with ingroup and outgroup players in these sequential games in an effort to obtain resources
through direct exchange rather than having to rely on “more uncertain generalized
exchange”. (p. 21)
Simpson [22] studied ingroup favoritism in the last play of the sequential PD game. He
argued that the first move (as studied by Yamagishi and colleagues) was affected by fear of
exploitation, but the last move was entirely influenced by greed because the second player has
a risk-free decision to cooperate for a lower payback or to exploit the cooperation of the first
player for a greater payback. Whereas Yamagishi and colleagues showed that ingroup favorit-
ism was switched off for first play fear responses, Simpson argued that ingroup favoritism
would be apparent in second-play greed responses even though these were not affected by
reciprocation expectations. His experiment supported this hypothesis, leading Simpson to
conclude that ingroup favoritism is motivated by social identity processes associated with cate-
gorization and positive distinctiveness rather than interpersonal interdependencies.
In response to Simpson’s experiment, Yamagishi and Mifune [21] have refined their think-
ing about the nature of reciprocation expectancies. These have often been considered as vehi-
cles for economic self-interest, but Yamagishi and Mifune [21] argue that they might primarily
be motivated by a concern for personal reputation—which would nonetheless have self-inter-
ested economic spin-offs. They created a no-fear, greed-only situation in a Dictator Game in
which the ‘dictator’ received the full allocation and then made a unilateral decision about how
much to allocate to a recipient. They found that, in comparison to a condition where the recip-
ient and receiver knew each other’s group identity (as studied by Simpson [22]), ingroup bias
was extinguished when the dictator knew the group identity of the recipient but the recipient
did not know the group status of the dictator. Dictators in this latter condition have a reduced
risk of gaining a bad reputation from ingroup members, who expect to receive more from fel-
low ingroup members.
According to Yamagishi and Mifune [21], reciprocation expectations set up, and respond
to, behavioral norms, which in turn affect individual reputations: “what is responsible for in-
group favoring behavior is. . .the possible implications for one’s reputation, leading to exclu-
sion from the group.” (p. 51) This is an alternative to economic interdependence theory.
Ingroup favoritism arises through the dependence of the reputation of the actor to meet the
normative expectations for behavior among ingroup (and outgroup) members rather than the
dependence for economic profit on ingroup reciprocation and collusion.
Historically, interdependence theory had underpinned economic self-interest explanations
of ingroup favoritism, but Yamagishi and Mifune have proposed a norm-based interdepen-
dence theory that is entirely compatible with social identity theory. In fact, this theory takes us
full circle back to Tajfel’s early explanation of the behavior of MGP participants. Before he set-
tled on the idea that ingroup favoritism was driven by self-esteem motives, Tajfel [23] argued
that “human beings behave as they do because of the social expectations with which they enter
an experiment—or any other social situation.” (p.72). He attributed ingroup favoritism to the
human motive to act appropriately, and suggested that the MGP data be subject to “cultural
analysis” of “the general norms and values that respondents were importing in order to deal
with the novel situation.”(see [24], p.60). Cooperating with ingroup members was culturally
deemed to be the right thing to do, as was intergroup fairness, which was so common that
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Tajfel [25] originally argued that allocations were “a compromise between fairness and favour-
ing one’s own group.” (p. 102). Being altruistic toward ingroup members is a way of creating a
good reputation, leading to one being accepted into a network of generalized exchange, which
is a precondition for acquiring positive identity and economic resources in social networks
[21]. On the other hand, being fair to outgroups is a way of being an egalitarian citizen [26].
The value of these strategic goals in acting appropriately differs in importance, depending on
the norms of the culture in which the experiment is undertaken, or the norms of the experi-
mental situation, which can be manipulated, for example, by describing allocations as “points”
or “payment” (ibid.).
The Entangled Causes of Ingroup Favoritism
MGP research was initiated in the context of a debate about economic versus social psycholog-
ical causes of ingroup favoritism. It has often taken the form of an either-or question: Is
ingroup giving motivated by economic self-interest or by the desire to establish positive dis-
tinctiveness for members of a social category? The research cited above shows that group
members tend to favor ingroup members in making resource allocations, but that this effect
can be switched off or even reversed when interdependence with ingroup members is
removed. There is thus widespread support for Rabbie et al.’s [14] claim that ingroup favorit-
ism is motivated by economic self-interest, based on the expectation that ingroup members
will reciprocate giving [27].
However, this research does not contradict Tajfel and Turner’s claim that social psychologi-
cal motives underlie the phenomenon. There are a number of reasons to draw this conclusion.
First, some research has found that ingroup favoritism is not influenced by the dependence
manipulations, as was the case for Gaertner and Insko’s [18] female participants (see also
[28]). Stroebe, Lodewijkx and Spears [29] found that ingroup favoritism in the MGP was influ-
enced both by interpersonal interdependencies and by positive distinctiveness motives linked
to social categorization. The importance of social identity dynamics is also underscored by
research that has examined the way group membership in the MGP affects participants’ evalu-
ation of others’ failure to show ingroup favoritism. The positive distinctiveness hypothesis is
supported by the finding that MGP participants are less envious and more charitable toward
ingroup members, even to the extent of forgiving their ‘misbehavior’ in terms of non-coopera-
tion, outgroup giving, or lack of reciprocation [30, 31].
Collectively, this research raises questions about the wisdom of the “either-or” approach
that has often been adopted in this field of investigation [29, 32]. The validity of interdepen-
dence versus social identity explanations of ingroup favoritism are often tested in designs that
seek to manipulate outcome dependence and categorization orthogonally. A recent study by
Platow, Grace and Smithson [33] suggests that this objective might ultimately not be attain-
able. They showed that categorization in the MGP was a sufficient condition to produce per-
ceptions of interdependence. Together with the fact that interdependence induces
categorization, this research indicates that social categorization and perceived interdepen-
dence are inextricably bound up together, with each being sufficient to produce the other. This
causal entanglement is also evident in the reputational consequences of ingroup reciprocation
expectations: Categorization affects behavioral norms, which are underlying resources for
both material and reputational gain [21].
These causal entanglements suggests that research might profit from adopting a different
strategy for studying ingroup favouritism. We recommend an evolutionary approach—one
that seeks to show how the various underlying causes work together under different conditions
of interdependence to stimulate or weaken ingroup favouritism.
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Interaction and the Evolution of Ingroup Favoritism
Our program of research does not propose a method for disentangling the causes of ingroup
favoritism in the MGP. Rather, we study the way in which these strategic beliefs and motives
function together in interaction over time and in different contexts to produce changing pat-
terns of ingroup favoritism. Interdependence theory provides a useful starting point for our
investigation because it situates ingroup favoritism in the context of social relationships:
between groups in relations of status and power; and between individuals in relations of obli-
gation and expectation. Sherif’s summer camp studies showed that ingroup favoritism could
be produced by placing groups in relations of competition, and then eradicated when groups
cooperated to attain a superordinate goal. However, these studies also showed that intergroup
relationships were only partly under the control of the experimenters. The conflict and cooper-
ation that emerged in interaction produced unanticipated outcomes, causing one study to be
terminated early because of the violence that emerged and another study to be abandoned
entirely when the groups of boys became allied against the experimenters [7, 34].
The MGP was developed to give experimenters more control by eliminating interaction
between the groups and individuals in the experimental situation. The prohibition against
interaction has meant, however, that thoroughly interactive phenomena such as interdepen-
dence and reciprocation have had to be carefully redefined and operationalized in non-inter-
active and static terms. In the research reviewed above, for example, outcome dependence has
been manipulated by setting up various expectations for reciprocation. This has been done
using allocation matrices where the experimenter either (a) informs participants that they
received or did not receive tokens from ingroup or outgroup members in the past (e.g. [13, 15,
16]), or (b) defines allocation rules, manipulating whether rewards can come from either the
ingroup, the outgroup, both the ingroup and the outgroup, or from the experimenter (e.g. [14,
17, 18, 29]).
Experimental games relax the restrictions on interaction that are enforced in MGP that use
allocation matrices. Prisoner’s Dilemma games, for example, are interactional in the sense that
outcomes depend on the actual decisions of both players [32]. However, these studies don’t
facilitate true interaction either. In simultaneous games [20], the decisions of each player do
not affect each other. First-player decisions in sequential games—the fear responses studied by
Yamagishi and Kiyonari—are also not fully interactive, because they are not responses but one-
off decisions. While second-player decisions in sequential games [22] are interactive responses
to prior actions, the reason that they are stripped of all fear is because they constitute a final
move—a last word—and will receive no response in return.
True interaction involves sequences of action, response, and reaction. Chen and Li [30]
asked participants to allocate tokens to two other anonymous participants over a series of five
rounds. They found that participants allocated almost equal amounts to two others who
belonged to the same group—either ingroup or outgroup members—but they allocated more
to ingroup members who were paired with outgroup members. The results also suggests that
the difference between ingroup and outgroup allocation increased over the sequence of
rounds. Although Chen and Li [30] did not test the difference between these slopes, the results
suggest that ingroup favoritism strengthened over time. Just as repeated plays of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game can teach participants the benefits of cooperation [35], so too can ingroup
favoritism evolve in interaction. Cacault, Goette, Lalive and Thoenig [36] asked members of
three-person groups to contribute to public goods pools over a series of 5 rounds. When given
the opportunity, group members acted aggressively by contributing to a commons that
adversely affected outgroup earnings when they could (at no cost) have contributed to a com-
mons that benefited both groups. Importantly, they also found a changing pattern of behavior
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over the sequence of rounds. Outgroup aggression in earlier rounds promoted altruistic giving
in later rounds in comparison with the experimental condition that did not allow aggression.
Dorrough, Glo¨ckner, Hellmann and Ebert [37] asked members of two real world groups to
play a sequence of 20 simultaneous PD games, first with 10 different members one group
(ingroup or outgroup, counterbalanced), then with 10 different members of the other group.
They found no evidence of ingroup favoritism at round 1, but found that ingroup favoritism
increased over repeated contacts, and was linked to the expectation of ingroup reciprocation,
especially in the shift between groups between rounds 10 and 11.
Chen and Li [30], Cacault et al. [36], and Dorrough et al., [37] studied ingroup favoritism
over a sequence of rounds, and showed that subsequent behaviors may be influenced by prior
actions. Nonetheless, these experiments lacked the responsive quality of true interaction. They
did not give the recipients the opportunity to respond by making an allocation to the original
allocator or the other recipients in the subsequent rounds. Such behavior would constitute a
fully interactive network because at each point in a sequence of behaviors each actor has the
opportunity to respond to all prior interactions, allowing the participants to collectively consti-
tute the environment for subsequent interactions.
We have identified two studies that have investigated how participation in a fully interactive
network affects ingroup favoritism. Goette, Huffman and Meier [38] studied military recruits
in the Swiss army who had been randomly assigned into platoons and who spent weeks living
together and interacting with members of their own platoon but without competition between
platoons. In the wake of this interaction, participants played simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma
games and were found to cooperate more willingly with ingroup members. Goette, Huffman
and Meier [38] replicated the experiment but included a control condition of randomly
assigned minimal groups that had no opportunity to interact. They found higher levels of
cooperation among randomly assigned interacting than randomly assigned minimal groups.
These results support other research that shows that interaction promotes a sense of group-
ness, which can affect behavioral outcomes [39, 40].
The within-group interaction among platoon members in these experiments extended over
time and allowed all group members to interact with each other, responding to previous
actions. The network was fully interactive, but with uncontrolled and undocumented interac-
tion, and so we have no way of knowing what features of interaction produced the outcomes
of interest, or how prior interactions affected subsequent ones. The interaction was a ‘black
box’ of unknown content—but which as a whole was shown to affect social identity, collective
behavior, and ingroup favoritism.
In recent years, computer simulations using simple artificial agents have gone some way to
open the black box of interaction. They have shown how group-based phenomena such as eth-
nocentrism can emerge over time, as agents make simple decisions to either defect or cooper-
ate with ingroup and outgroup agents [41]. Such simulations situate social behavior in fully
interactive networks, where all agents may interact with all others, and where action at any
point in time is a response to what went before and constitutes the interactional context for
subsequent behavior. Simulations have helped to identify conditions that promote the evolu-
tion of ingroup favoritism—including lower cost of cooperation, a greater number of groups,
greater communication between agents, and an optimal—midrange—rate of migration
between groups [42–46].
These software agents might make simple, rule-governed and self-interested decisions,
stripped of the complexity of human social life, but the simulations lay bare the evolutionary
dynamics of ingroup favoritism. These fully interactive social contexts show that the “dynamic
nature of bias results from complex social network interactions which play a central role in
human societies.” ([43] p.1). These networks of interactions simultaneously reflect and
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produce interpersonal and intergroup interdependencies, which evolve in interaction to con-
stitute the “nature of the relations between groups” which Sherif [7] and Tajfel [47] both recog-
nized was the foundation of ingroup favoritism.
Hypotheses and Expectations: Intragroup and Interpersonal Social
Interdependence
We used the VIAPPL experimental platform to facilitate and document interaction and its
effects in the MGP (see www.viappl.org). We created exchange games in VIAPPL in which
each participant was represented by an avatar located in a sparse virtual arena in which all
other participant avatars were visible (see Fig 1). Each participant owned a balance of tokens,
and the games were played by a single rule: each participant was required to give one token to
any other player in the arena during each round of play. Token exchanges were made by click-
ing on any avatar in the arena, and ‘giving’ the token. Each act of giving added one token to
the recipient’s fortune (or balance), and subtracted one token from the giver’s balance. At the
conclusion of each round all the exchanges and final token balances were represented on the
screen for all participants to see.
The games reported in this article all had 14 players and were played over 40 rounds. We
manipulated the initial starting balances to create equal and unequal situations. In addition,
we manipulated group condition by creating two types of games: one in which all players were
undifferentiated individuals, and another in which participants were assigned to one of two
minimal groups, each identifiable by a distinct avatar color. We manipulated inequality
orthogonally to group membership, creating equal and unequal individual and group games.
Finally, in Study 1 only, we replicated each condition with a competition, fairness or no-norm
(control) prime. The design thus manipulated intergroup interdependencies, allowing us to
investigate the exchange practices of equal status, high status, and low status groups and indi-
viduals in different normative climates. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions
in these studies, and determined sample size in advance of data collection by ensuring that we
had sufficient number of game replications in each condition of the design.
Our dependent variable was defined by the target of giving. We recorded whether each
player in each round gave their token to an ingroup member, an outgroup member, or to
Fig 1. Illustration of a VIAPPL environment, where avatars are circles, the current participant is bold,
and each player’s token balance is indicated alongside the avatar.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.g001
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themselves. Given the 40-round game structure, each form of giving potentially ranged from 0
to 40, and there were dependencies between the three forms of giving which together summed
to 40. Ingroup favoritism was indexed by higher ingroup and lower outgroup giving. Even
though the avatars in the individual condition were not represented as distinguishable group
members, to compare allocation practices in the individual and group conditions we treated
each individual as having the group identity of the individual in the same position in the arena
in the group condition.
In the light of the substantial literature on ingroup favoritism in the MGP we propose the
following general hypotheses for the effects of the experimental manipulations:
HG1. There will be more ingroup giving and less outgroup giving in the group than individual
condition.
HG2. In the inequality condition there will be more “compensatory” ingroup giving and less
outgroup giving among low status groups, and there will be more “compensatory” outgroup
giving and less ingroup giving among high status groups. We expect compensatory
responses because our inequality condition is illegitimate in the sense that it is imposed by
experimenters and not ‘earned’ by the participants [11]. In contrast, because status relations
in the equality condition are insecure, we anticipated competitive ingroup favoritism in the
equal status games.
HG3. Competition primes will strengthen ingroup favoritism whereas fairness norms will
weaken ingroup favoritism.
We anticipated that these effects would interact with each other by strengthening ingroup
favoritism when they are aligned or by weakening ingroup giving when they are not aligned.
For example, compensatory ingroup giving of low status groups and outgroup giving of high
status groups will be further strengthened by the fairness prime, whereas the competitive
ingroup favoritisms in the equality condition will be strengthened by the competition prime.
It is only in Round 1 that the experimental situation is fully defined by the experimenters,
as is usually the case in MGP experiments. As the games unfold, the exchanges that occur in
each round begin to change the environment of individual and group balances and differences.
Moreover, a sense of sociality emerges as ties are made between individuals and groups and
players respond by reciprocating (or not), acting selfishly, or by ingroup or outgroup favorit-
ism. Thus, each replication of a game with the same set of starting conditions will not be
expected to produce the same outcome. This is the evolutionary process that is our primary
interest.
In this exploratory study we investigate how ingroup favoritism evolves over time and in
response to different starting experimental conditions. We propose the following temporal
hypotheses about the evolution of ingroup favoritism in social interaction.
HT1. Static model without interdependence: Behavior is prescribed by a fixed underlying
cause or set of causes (e.g., economic self-interest or positive distinctiveness motive) that
assumes a constant strength from round one. The motives and beliefs underlying such
interaction are similar to the fixed “happiness rules” that inform agent behavior in simple
simulations. Although no one explicitly defends this model, it is implicit in most research
that only makes use of one-off observations to identify the cause—in an either-or fashion—
of ingroup favoritism. This is the model, without interdependence, that John Turner spent
a lifetime arguing against [5].
HT2. Interpersonal interdependence model of emerging norms (Monotonic change model).
This is similar to the static model, but with normative strengthening of tendencies. We
Evolution of Ingroup Favoritism in Interaction
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974 November 16, 2016 9 / 26
expect monotonic change as initial behavioral tendencies strengthen over time as they
acquire normative status.
HT3. Intergroup interdependence model: This is similar to the interpersonal interdependence
model, but we expect different emergent norms under different conditions of intergroup
relations as predicted by Social Identity Theory [3, 4].
HT4. Dynamic interdependence model (non-monotonic change model). This model antici-
pates that behavioral imperatives and norms are (1) shaped by nature of the relations
between groups and individuals within groups, and (2) change over time as they are shaped
by prior actions. Intergroup hierarchies and the legitimacy and stability of intergroup rela-
tions are not stable ([11] p.8), neither are reciprocation expectancies; so we also anticipated
effects where initially dominant responses might strengthen, weaken or even reverse over
time.
HT1 is opposed to the other temporal hypotheses, and while we don’t expect to find evi-
dence for HT1, we did not hypothesize which of HT2, HT3 and HT4 we expected to identify, or
which would be most prominent.
Study 1
Method
Sample. The sample consisted of 1005 student volunteers (490 female, 476 Male; 855
Black, 27 White, 49 Indian, 32 Coloured) from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
The mean age of the participants was 20.59 years (SD = 2.16 years). All participants provided
written informed consent to participate in the study, which had been approved by the Human
Sciences Research Ethics Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Design. Participants played 40-round games in which they were required to allocate one
token per round to any of the participants in the game, including themselves. We paid all par-
ticipants a standard incentive of R20 for their participation irrespective of their final token bal-
ance, meaning that the tokens had a purely symbolic value. The requirement to allocate one
and only one token per round resulted in a structural dependency between ingroup-, out-
group-, and self-giving, yielding compositional data in which each participant’s outgroup-,
ingroup-, and self-giving summed to one in each round, and 40 over the rounds.
Four experimental factors were operationalized as follows:
Group condition. Participants were randomly assigned to play either as undifferentiated
individuals or as members of visually distinctive groups. Assignment to minimal groups was
random but was done via a painting preference task in which participants indicated their pref-
erence for a painting by Klee or Kandinsky. In the individual condition, player avatars were
notionally assigned to the same groups as in the group conditions, but participants were not
aware of this group membership because no visual or textual indicators of group membership
were given. In the individual inequality condition, this underlying group membership was
made evident by the difference in starting balance between the high status and low status
individuals.
Equality condition. Equality condition was manipulated orthogonally to group condi-
tion. Half the games in the group and individual conditions were equal status games and the
other half were unequal status games. In the equal status games, all participants were assigned
the same starting token balance, namely 30 tokens. In unequal status games, participants
assigned to the low status condition were allocated 20 tokens, whereas participants assigned to
the high status condition were allocated 40 tokens. This manipulation created a second
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experimental factor, Equality Condition, with three levels—equal status (n = 503), low status
(n = 251) and high status (n = 252).
Norm condition. Immediately before starting the game, the participants completed an
adaptation of the verbal memory task developed by Hertel and Fiedler [12, 48], which primed
either no norm, fairness or competition. Neutral words, such as computer, car and tree, were
used throughout the three primes. Only neutral words were used in the control (no norm)
condition. Competition was evoked through words such as opponent, hostility, struggle;
whereas the fairness prime included words such as balance, justice, and democratic.
Time. We partitioned the data for each game into 5 waves of 8 rounds each, and summed
the tokens given to self, ingroup, and outgroup in each wave.
When crossed, these factors resulted in a 12-cell design, where each of the 12 cells repre-
sented a VIAPPL game to be played by 14 participants under a specific set of conditions, with
the game in each cell replicated six times. This resulted in a total of 72 VIAPPL games in the
study with 1005 participants (three participants failed to complete the game), making a total of
5025 observations of ingroup- outgroup- and self-giving (1005 participants by five 8-round
waves).
Results
Counts of ingroup-, outgroup-, and self-giving could each range from 0 to 8 (and jointly
summed to 8) in each wave. Ingroup- and outgroup-giving were approximately normally dis-
tributed, but self-giving was positively skewed and zero-inflated. The frequency of self-giving
was relatively low compared to ingroup- and outgroup-giving, but increased steadily over time
(See Fig 2). There was no difference in the frequency of ingroup- and outgroup-giving at the
start of the games, but outgroup-giving declined over time whereas the rate of ingroup-giving
held constant. It appears as though self-giving partially replaced outgroup-giving but not
ingroup-giving in later rounds of the games.
We planned to use multi-level modelling (NLME and LME4 packages in R) to account for
the nesting of the three kinds of token giving (1) in waves, (2) repeated by individuals, who, in
turn, were (3) nested in games. However, it proved infeasible to analyse our compositional,
longitudinal data with multi-level models. We thus decided to analyze ingroup versus out-
group giving independently from self-giving, eliminating the compositional aspect of the data,
and allowing us to use multilevel models. We operationalized ingroup favoritism as the pro-
portion of non-self-giving that was ingroup giving:
Ingroup Favoritism ¼
ingroup giving
ingroup giving þ outgroup giving
This removes the longitudinal trend of rising self-giving—which was evident in all cells of
the design –from the dependent variable, and in the process rectifies the dependency in the
compositional nature of the data. It also eliminates the problem of skewness and zero-inflation
that was apparent with the self-giving data. Because self-giving was zero-inflated, we reduced
self-giving to a binary variable for each individual in each wave to index whether any self-giv-
ing apparent in that wave. We then conducted a binomial regression (using generalized linear
mixed modelling) to predict self-giving from the main effects, Time, Group Condition, Equal-
ity Condition, and Norm Condition. Only Time significantly predicted self-giving (z = 10.46,
p< .0001). Models that included interaction terms would not converge, perhaps due to the
zero inflation. This analysis together with an inspection of descriptive data showed that self-
giving increased over time for all the experimental conditions, and that the mean level of self-
giving was the same in all experimental conditions.
Evolution of Ingroup Favoritism in Interaction
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974 November 16, 2016 11 / 26
Preliminary analyses of ingroup favoritism indicated that the random intercept models sig-
nificantly improved model fit, in comparison with the null model (AICnull = 1183.19). We first
included only games as a random factor, which improved fit over the null model
(AIC = 740.68; LRatio = 444.51, df = 1, p<. 0001), and then we tested the model that included
individuals and games as random factors, which also improved fit significantly over the null
model, and produced a much smaller value of AIC (AIC = -130.79, LRatio = 1317.97, df = 2, p
<. 0001). We then added the four fixed effects to the model, and compared the model with
random intercepts (AIC = -273.89) against the model with random intercepts and random
slopes (AIC = -394.71), treating time as a random effect. Adding random slopes improved the
fit (LRatio = 128.83, df = 4, p<.0001). We decided on the basis of this preliminary testing to
include the three nested random effects subjects, time, and games, in further multilevel mod-
els, estimating random effects for intercepts and slope terms.
Because of the complexity of the model and the size of the dataset, we used a simple model
with a single Time by Group condition interaction to experiment with different correlation
structures to take the autocorrelation between the repeated observations into account. The
AR1 correction improved the model fit (LRatio = 25.96, p<.0001) and improved the distribu-
tion of the residuals, which were approximately normally distributed with the double nesting
in place.
Fig 2. Mean frequency of ingroup-, outgroup- and self-giving over time (Study 1, symbolic tokens). I
bars are independent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.g002
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We then tested the full model by adding the 4-way interaction and all lower order interac-
tions into the mixed effects multilevel model described above. The interactions of a higher
order than two-way were not significant, nor were any of the effects involving norm condition.
We thus ran the final model that included the two significant two-way interactions—Time by
Group Condition and Time by Equality Condition—and the main effects (see Table 1). The
model achieved a fit no worse than the fit provided by the model with all the two way interac-
tions present (AIC = -374.70 vs -296.76, LogLik = 203.35 vs 176.38, LRatio = 14.65, p> 0.26),
and also no worse than that provided by the model with all the three-way interactions (AIC =
-374.70 vs -222.29, LogLik = 203.35 vs 151.15, LRatio = 32.68, p> 0.11). Estimates of AIC, and
Log Likelihood were obtained for each model using restricted maximum likelihood algorithms
(REML), but model comparisons (the likelihood ratio) were computed using full maximum
likelihood (ML). For our model with the two two-way interactions, we also computed pseudo-
R2 values for the overall model, following the approach of Nakagawa and Schielzeth [49],
which returned marginal and conditional R2 values of 0.10 and 0.50 respectively (the marginal
R2 represents the proportion of variance explained by the fixed effects, and the conditional R2
the proportion explained by the random effects; it is clear that in our model both fixed and
random effects are substantial, but random effects account for a lot more variation than the
fixed effects). Table 1 reports both general level Anova results for the model (Type II SS), and
model fixed effect coefficients. The coefficients have associated 95% confidence intervals
reported, as well as approximate standardizations of the coefficient values (they are scaled by
the residual standard deviation). These results are intended to provide a sense of the substan-
tive size of the effects, rather than just their statistical significance.
The main effect for Time indicates that, overall, there was a slight tendency for ingroup
favoritism to increase over time. The interaction between Time and Group Condition shows
that this effect was apparent among players who were assigned to minimal groups, but not
among players in the individual condition—see Fig 3, where we report means and 95% confi-
dence intervals around the means.
Participants in the minimal groups started out making more ingroup versus outgroup allo-
cations than participants in the individual condition, and this difference strengthened over the
course of the games. Given that there is no significant difference in the mean level of self-giv-
ing in the individual and group conditions, these results suggest that self-giving replaces
Table 1. ANOVA and coefficient summary of multilevel model of the 2013 data, symbolic token exchange.
Fixed Effects Model coefficients
Source χ2 Df p < Source B Lower CI Upper CI b / rsd
Experiment Round (Time) 3.94 1 0.048 Intercept 0.52 0.49 0.55
Group 50.33 1 0.001 Time 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08
Equality 124.81 2 0.001 Group -0.10 -0.06 -0.13 -0.46
Group x Time 3.63 1 0.057 Equality: high vs equal -0.10 -0.06 -0.14 -0.47
Equality x Time 18.95 2 0.001 Equality: low vs equal 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.70
Random effects Time X Group -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.05
Source Int. (SD) Slope (SD) R Time X Equality_high 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02
Time | Game 0.03* 0.01* 0.33 Time X Equality_low -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.11
Time | Game | Particip 0.1*3 0.03* -0.28
Residual 0.21
Note: CI = 95% confidence interval. rsd = residual standard deviation. Int. = intercept.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.t001
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outgroup giving in the minimal groups, but replaces both ingroup and outgroup giving in the
individual condition.
The main effect for Equality Condition (see Fig 4) reflected the higher levels of ingroup
favoritism among the low status group than the equal status group and the lower levels of
ingroup favoritism among the high status group than the equal status group. High status par-
ticipants—who began with 40 tokens—allocated more tokens to the low status participants
than to their own group, whereas those who started the game with 20 tokens allocated more to
the ingroup than the outgroup. This is the pattern of compensatory allocation we expected in
the context of an illegitimate inequality; and the absence of a three-way interaction indicated
that the pattern was apparent equally in the group and individual conditions.
The interaction between Equality Condition and Time provides very strong support for the
need for an evolutionary approach to the study of ingroup favoritism. The pattern of compen-
satory giving to the low status groups is very strong among the high and low status groups at
the beginning of the game, but declines for both groups in the second half of the game. Perhaps
this decline can be anticipated for high status groups for whom ingroup favoritism begins to
play a stronger role as the initial inequality begins to decline. It is surprising, however, that low
status groups increase the rate of giving to the high status groups in later rounds even when
the intergroup inequality persists. It appears as though the generosity from the high status out-
group in earlier rounds promotes reciprocation that serves to preserve the inequality. This is
Fig 3. Interaction between Group Condition and Time (Study 1, symbolic tokens). I bars are
independent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.g003
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the case despite the fact that inequality persists throughout, with the mean round balances
after each wave being as follows: 151:266, 161:256, 170:248, 177:241, and 180:237.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 supported hypotheses HG1 and HG2, but not HG3. Ingroup favoritism
was stronger in the group than the individual condition (HG1), and we observed the pattern of
compensatory outgroup giving among the high status groups and compensatory ingroup giv-
ing among the low status groups in the inequality condition (HG2). There was no effect for the
norm condition manipulation (HG3), either because the prime was not powerful enough to
induce norms, or because competition and fairness norms have no bearing on behavior in this
context. In sum, these findings provide strong support for the social identity theory of ingroup
favoritism among minimal groups. Ingroup favoritism was apparent in the allocation of tokens
that had no monetary value and was much more frequent than self-giving. This pattern of giv-
ing appeared to be motivated by the desire to be in the ‘winning group’ irrespective of material
rewards. Previous MGP research has been criticized for excluding self-interest [28], but we
found evidence of ingroup favoritism in the presence of self-giving; and in fact, the increasing
incidence of self-giving in later rounds, appeared to strengthen ingroup favoritism. Overall,
Study 1 supported the intergroup interdependence model of social identity theory, which
Fig 4. Interaction between Equality Condition and Time (Study 1, symbolic tokens). I bars are
independent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.g004
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anticipates that ingroup favoritism effects will be contingent upon the situation. Accordingly,
we were able to create a situation of ingroup favoritism in the equal status condition,
strengthen this tendency for low status groups, and reverse it for high status groups.
The finding that that the two significant interactions involved Time supports our argument
for the importance of an evolutionary approach to studying ingroup favoritism. The data show
that ingroup favoring norms tend to increase over time. This supports the hypothesis HT2 that
proposed that initial behavioral tendencies would strengthen as they acquired normative sta-
tus. This trend was apparent both in the case of ingroup favoritism and self-giving. The results
for the inequality condition support the intergroup interdependence hypothesis, HT3, which
proposed that different emergent norms would evolve under different conditions of inter-
group relations.
Study 2
Study 2 was a replication and extension of Study 1, but we used monetary rather than symbolic
rewards, and excluded Norm Condition, which was found to have no impact on the allocations
in Study 1. In this replication of the experiment, conducted in 2014, each token represented
one South African Rand (approximately US $ 0.09), and the participants were told that they
would receive as payment the token balance they achieved at the end of the game. Given these
material outcomes, we anticipated greater self-giving and ingroup favoritism as group mem-
bers used ingroup affiliation and reciprocation expectations to increase their material rewards.
Method
Sample. The sample consisted of 224 student volunteers (97% female, 125 Male; 209
Black, 3 White, 3 Coloured, 6 Indian) who each participated in one of 16 14-player experimen-
tal games. The mean age of the participants was 20.47 years (SD = 2.28 years). All participants
provided written informed consent to participate in the study, which had been approved by
the Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Design. During each of the 40 rounds of each game, participants were required to give
one token to any of the participants in the game, including themselves. Three experimental
factors were operationalized as follows:
Group condition. Participants were randomly assigned to play either as undifferentiated
individuals (8 games) or as members of visually distinct groups (8 games). Assignment to min-
imal groups was random but was done via a dot estimation task by which participants were
informed that they would be assigned to a group of ‘over estimators’ or ‘under estimators’. In
the individual condition, player avatars were assigned to the same groups as in the group con-
ditions, but participants were not aware of this group membership because no visual or textual
indicators of group membership were given (Except where it could be inferred from different
starting token balances in the inequality condition).
Equality condition. Equality condition was manipulated orthogonally to group condi-
tion. Half the games in the group and individual conditions were equal status games and the
other half were unequal status games. In the equal status games, all participants were assigned
the same starting token balance, namely 20 tokens. In unequal status games, participants in the
low status group were assigned 10 tokens, whereas participants in the high status group were
assigned 30 tokens. This manipulation created a second experimental factor, Equality Condi-
tion—with three levels, equal status (n = 112), low status (n = 56) and high status (n = 56).
Time. We partitioned the data for each game into 5 waves of 8 rounds each, and summed
the number of tokens given to self, ingroup, and outgroup in each wave.
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Results
The total number of allocation decisions made in the experiment was 8960 (16 games x 14 par-
ticipants x 40 rounds), which resulted in 1120 8-round waves.
The distribution of ingroup-, outgroup-, and self-giving across all the 8-round waves
revealed a stronger ingroup favoritism preference than in Study 1. Self-giving remained nega-
tively skewed and very strongly zero inflated. Ingroup-giving was negatively skewed and out-
group-giving was positively skewed, reflecting the preference for ingroup-giving over
outgroup-giving.
Fig 5 reports the changing frequency of ingroup-, outgroup-, and self-giving over time. The
differential rate of ingroup- versus outgroup-giving expands in the second wave and then per-
sists throughout the games. In contrast, the rate of self-giving increases monotonically and
sharply over time, and it would appear as though self-giving replaces both ingroup- and out-
group-giving. In Study 1, by contrast, self-giving replaced outgroup- but not ingroup-giving.
We used multi-level modelling (NLME and LME4 packages in R) with maximum likeli-
hood estimation to analyze the data while taking onto consideration the nesting of token giv-
ing (1) in waves, (2) repeated by individuals, who, in turn, were (3) nested in games. We
computed ingroup favoritism in the same manner as we did in Study 1, as the ratio of
ingroup-giving to ingroup- plus outgroup-giving, thus removing self-giving from ingroup
Fig 5. Mean frequency of ingroup-, outgroup- and self-giving over time (Study 2, monetary tokens). I
bars are independent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.g005
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favoritism. The skewness in the data that we report above was fairly small, and when we
assessed the ML model residuals, these were approximately normal, suggesting that the skew-
ness did not adversely affect model results.
Preliminary analyses indicated that random intercept models significantly reduced the AIC
in comparison with the null model (null AIC = 767.25). We first included only games as a ran-
dom factor, which provided a better fit than the null model (AIC = 583.64; LRatio = 185.61,
df = 1, p< .0001) and then we tested the model that included individuals and games as ran-
dom factors, which provided a better fit too than the null model, with a lower AIC value
(AIC = 351.51, LRatio = 419.74, df = 2, p<.0001). We then added the three fixed effects to the
model, and compared the model with random intercepts (AIC = 309.41) to the model with
random intercepts and random slopes (AIC = 271.78). Adding random slopes improved the fit
(LRatio = 45.62, df = 4, p<.0001). The AR1 correction for autocorrelation improved the
model fit (LRatio = 9.51, df = 1, p<.002) and the residuals were approximately normally dis-
tributed with the double nesting in place.
We then tested the full model with the three-way interaction and all lower order interac-
tions and main effects. The three-way interaction was not significant (χ2 =.34, df = 2, p> .84);
neither was the two-way interaction between Group Condition and Equality Condition (χ2 =
2.91, df = 2, p> .23). Our final model thus included the two-way interactions between Time
and Group Condition and Time and Equality Condition and the three main effects (AIC =
−294.74, LogLik = -131.37) (see Table 2). Estimates of AIC, and Log Likelihood were obtained
for each model using restricted maximum likelihood algorithms (REML), but model compari-
sons (the likelihood ratio) were computed using full maximum likelihood (ML). For our
model with the two two-way interactions, we also computed pseudo-R2 values for the overall
model, following the approach of Nakagawa and Schielzeth [49], which returned marginal and
conditional R2 values of 0.22 and 0.59 respectively (it is clear that in our model both fixed and
random effects are substantial, but random effects account for a lot more variation than the
fixed effects). Table 2 reports both general level Anova results for the model (Type II SS), and
model fixed effect coefficients (from the REML model). The coefficients have associated 95%
confidence intervals reported, as well as approximate standardizations of the coefficient values
(they are scaled by the residual standard deviation). These results are intended to provide a
sense of the substantive size of the effects, rather than just their statistical significance.
Table 2. ANOVA and coefficient summary of multilevel model of the 2014 data, monetary token exchange.
Fixed Effects Model coefficients
Source χ2 Df p < Source B Lower CI Upper CI b / rsd
Experiment Round (Time) 0.86 1 0.35 Intercept 0.66 0.59 0.73
Group 46.18 1 0.001 Time 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05
Equality 38.74 2 0.001 Group -0.16 -0.25 -0.08 -0.67
Group x Time 5.66 1 0.02 Equality: high vs equal 0.19 0.09 -0.14 0.78
Equality x Time 17.25 2 0.001 Equality: low vs equal -0.22 -0.32 -0.12 -0.91
Random effects Time X Group -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14
Source Int. (SD) Slope (SD) R Time X Equality_high -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0/16
Time | Game 0.00* 0.02* 0.22 Time X Equality_low 0.03 -0.00 0.06 0.13
Time | Game | Particip 0.11* 0.03* 0.41
Residual 0.25
Note: CI = 95% confidence interval. rsd = residual standard deviation. Int. = intercept.
Overall test of random effects χ2(4) = 34.3, p < 0.001. Phi of correlation structure = 0.23.
* p < 0.05 for random effects
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.t002
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An inspection of the figures that represent how Group Condition (Fig 6) and Equality Con-
dition (Fig 7) interact with Time shows why the main effect for Time is not significant:
Ingroup favoritism changes in different directions in the different experimental conditions.
Overall participants showed more ingroup favoritism in the group than in the individual con-
dition (t = 4.08, df = 14, p< 0.002), but ingroup favoritism also tended to increase over time in
the group condition but decrease over time in the individual condition. Self-giving tends to
replace ingroup-giving in later rounds of the individual condition but tends to replace out-
group-giving in the group condition. Both graphs show a dip in ingroup favoritism in the final
period as self-giving begins to replace ingroup-giving. This decline is most likely what game
theorists refer to as an end-game effect, which is common in finitely repeated games [50]. In
this case, it appears that behavior became more overtly selfish as the game approached its end
because self-giving guaranteed additional tokens and the prospect of being sanctioned for self-
ishness—by not receiving tokens from ingroup members—decreased.
The main effect for Equality Condition replicate the finding that the low status group
showed higher ingroup favoritism than the equal status group (t = 4.50, df = 206, p< .0001),
whereas the high status group showed lower levels of ingroup favoritism than the equal status
group (t = 3.88, df = 206, p< .0001). This confirms our expectation that the high status group
would engage in compensatory outgroup favoritism given that our manipulation of inequality
was illegitimate. This difference between the high and low status groups decreased over time
Fig 6. Interaction between Group Condition and Time (Study 2, monetary tokens). I bars are
independent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.g006
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because the high status group showed more ingroup favoritism over time, whereas the low sta-
tus group showed less ingroup favoritism over time. In the final period, however, the high sta-
tus group showed sharply less ingroup favoritism as self-giving replaced ingroup- but not
outgroup-giving. These results provide strong evidence of an intergroup interdependence
effect. The high status groups started the games with a higher rate of outgroup- versus
ingroup-giving, but this generosity decreased over time as the initial illegitimate advantage
reduced but before the inequality was eliminated. The low status group members initially
favored their own group-players, but this ingroup favoritism also decreased over time as which
helped to preserve the intergroup inequality in later rounds (the mean round balances for the
high and low status groups after each wave are as follows: 191:89; 177:103; 166:115; 161:119;
157:123). By the forth wave there is not difference ingroup favoritism between the high and
lost status groups, because both groups are acting in a way that preserves the inequality.
Discussion
Study 2 found higher levels of ingroup favoritism and self-giving than Study 1, consistent with
the idea that these strategies were vehicles for leveraging economic gain. Overall, however, the
pattern of significant main and interaction effects was remarkably similar to that found in
Study 1. The results provided support for the hypothesis that ingroup favoritism would be
Fig 7. Interaction between Equality Condition and Time (Study 2, monetary tokens). I bars are
independent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0165974.g007
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stronger under the group than individual condition (HG1). The results for inequality con-
formed the compensatory giving we expected in the context of an illegitimate inequality
manipulation (HG2). The results confirm the importance of the effect of group-based inequali-
ties on social interdependencies.
The same interactions with Time were apparent in Study 2 as were evident in Study 1. The
difference between the levels of ingroup favoritism between the individual and group condi-
tion increased over time; and the levels of ingroup favoritism by the high and low status groups
converged over time. These findings support the interpersonal and intergroup interdepen-
dency hypotheses (HT2 and HT3) as was the case in Study 1.
Overall Discussion
Minimal group research has been deeply interested in the role that social interdependencies
play in promoting ingroup favoritism. Tajfel and his colleagues [1] initially focused on the way
intergroup interdependencies lead group members to act against their immediate economic
self-interest. In the unstable and equal status intergroup relations of their original minimal
groups studies they observed that participants declined greater ingroup rewards in absolute
terms to ensure that they were relatively better off than the other group. Group interests—
which would later be theorized by social identity theory—appeared to have replaced the eco-
nomic interests that Sherif had argued were necessary for prejudice. However, Tajfel and
Turner [3, 4] anticipated that there would be situations where ingroup bias would be absent or
even reversed. In particular, they argued that members of low status groups would show out-
group favoritism when their low status was deemed legitimate or when the social system was
deemed stable.
It soon became clear that interpersonal and intragroup interdependencies also affected
reward allocations in the MGP. Participants tended to favor those who had favored them in
the past or were likely to favor them in the future. These findings provided the basis for an
alternative explanation of ingroup favoritism in the MGP. Because participants expected
higher levels of reciprocation from ingroup members than outgroup members, they show
‘ingroup favoritism’ in allocating to ingroup members in the hope that they will ultimately
gain when ingroup members allocated to them in return (cf. [51]).
A great deal of MGP research has been devoted to teasing apart social identity processes
from interdependency processes in minimal group situations. Is ingroup favoritism produced
by categorization and identification or is it produced by reciprocation expectations? Recent
evidence and a number of reviews have reached the conclusion that both processes affect
behavior in the MGP and, moreover, that the two processes are themselves mutually interde-
pendent [27, 32]. Categorization is a sufficient condition for perceptions of interdependence,
and interdependence is a sufficient condition for categorization. Consequently, further
attempts to tease these apart experimentally might not be fruitful.
One of the consequences of this avenue of investigation has been to fix attention on ingroup
favoritism rather than, say, on the conditions that promote outgroup favoritism. This has posi-
tioned MGP research within the social psychological tradition of work that addressed the ‘prej-
udice problematic’[52]. In contrast to economists who tended to see the positive aspects of
“ingroup altruism” social psychologists focused on the problem of prejudice that was exempli-
fied by ingroup favoritism in the MGP.
The present research makes two novel contributions to this tradition of social psychological
scholarship. Our first contribution was explicit right from the beginning of this research proj-
ect: we have investigated how ingroup favoritism evolves over time. To achieve this goal we
put in place two essential conditions for the evolution of social life, namely, interaction
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between social actors, and a temporal context in which behaviors are allowed to influence each
other and begin to create emergent contexts for subsequent interaction. We developed
VIAPPL as an experimental platform for an evolutionary social psychology (see viappl.org).
Our minimal group studies in this interactive context confirm the expectations that categoriza-
tion promotes ingroup favoritism and that an illegitimate status hierarchy can promote com-
pensatory outgroup favoritism among high status groups and ingroup favoritism among low
status groups.
In addition, the present research shows how the strength of ingroup favoritism may change
over time. One reason for this is because acts of ingroup-, outgroup- and self-giving may
acquire normative status and acceptability as they are picked up by other participants during
the course of the interaction. This appeared to be the case for self-giving, which was a dispre-
ferred, low frequency behavior at the start of the games, but which became more popular over
time. In addition to emerging norms, there was a second way in which interaction produces
change: behavior that responds to initial structural conditions can change those conditions
thereby weakening the rationale for that behavior. This was evident in the weakening pattern
of compensatory ingroup and outgroup giving of the low and high status groups in both stud-
ies. This pattern of allocation gradually reduced the intergroup inequality which, in turn,
weakened the need for compensation and reduced the outgroup favoritism among high status
group members and ingroup favoritism among low status group members. These results indi-
cate that compensatory ingroup favoritism of low status groups and outgroup favoritism of
high status groups is quickly extinguished. This pattern of compensatory intergroup behavior
that has been evident in non-evolutionary minimal group studies and in early rounds of the
present studies does not appear to persist over time. Both high and low status groups changed
their exchange behavior in later rounds to preserve the inequality that was initially deemed
illegitimate.
In addition to promoting an evolutionary approach, this study has made a second contribu-
tion to the MGP literature. Although our data confirms much of what we already know about
ingroup favoritism, it also sheds light on some of the processes that may undermine social
change orientation of minority group members. Social identity theory ascribes outgroup favor-
itism among minority group members to a stable and oppressive social system which prevents
the cultivation of cognitive alternatives, and which fosters self-depreciating responses among
minority group members [9, 53]. Jost and Banaji [54] argued that these were system justifying
responses that helped oppressed groups to “adapt to the unjust or unpleasant realities that
appear to be inevitable.” ([55] p.146)
In contrast to both of these accounts, the present research proposes interactional reasons
for the outgroup favoritism of minority group members. In both studies, the initial ingroup
favoritism of the low status groups decreased over the course of the game to the point where it
was equal to the ingroup favoritism of equal and high status groups despite the fact that sub-
stantial inequalities remained between the groups. Members of the poor group began to
increasingly favor the wealthy group in making allocations. Why would they act against their
own group interest in this way? One possibility is that they did so to reciprocate for the favor
the high status group had shown them in earlier rounds of compensatory outgroup favoritism
of the high status group. Another possibility is that they hoped to elicit future reciprocation
and benefit by giving to wealthy outgroup members. Perhaps the lowered inequality and the
early compensatory exchanges led the participants to view remaining equality as more legiti-
mate than the initial unearned inequality that the experimenters had imposed.
Whatever the reason, the results suggests that intergroup interdependencies created by
inequality can affect the kind of interpersonal interdependences that social actors attempt to
set up. Generous treatment from high status group members may build expectations of fair
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treatment, which may in turn promote outgroup favoritism among low status groups in the
face of ongoing inequality, even when the expectations of fair treatment from this high status
group are not met (cf. [56]).
In the article we have advanced a minimal group interaction paradigm (MGIP) in order to
study the evolution of ingroup and outgroup favoritism in interactive exchange networks.
VIAPPL reintroduces social interaction into the context of social psychological experiments,
marking a return to the interactive experiments of an earlier generation (Sherif, Asch, Mil-
gram, and Zimbardo). However, in contrast to these earlier interactive experiments, the form
of interaction in VIAPPL is strictly controlled and observed so that it is possible to document
the evolution of social life and its outcomes. In this article, however, our progress in studying
inter- and intra-group interdependencies has been limited by our use of aggregate data and
statistical techniques that assume independence of observations, and that thus partial out the
real interdependencies in the data at a local level (i.e. between actors). In future work we plan
to study local structural interdependencies using the methods of network analysis.
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